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The new administration of President Donald Trump is pushing for its European allies to incre-
ase their defence budgets and their military commitment to international security to a much 
greater extent than previous US administrations. At the 53rd Munich Security Conference and 
the meeting of NATO defence ministers in February, the US Secretary of Defence Gen. James 
Mattis and the Vice-President of the United States Mike Pence spoke in this vein. This message 
is directed at Germany in particular, which has so far been unwilling to substantially increase 
its defence budget (in 2016 it stood at 1.19% of GDP, i.e. €34.2 billion), or to send the Bunde-
swehr to operations abroad. 
Berlin’s response to the US pressure will take into account both political realities (elections 
to the Bundestag in autumn 2017) and the broader German approach to security policy. Ger-
many will gradually increase its defence expenditure in the future, albeit without reaching 
the level of 2% of GDP. At the same time, the German government will seek to redefine how 
European defence spending is calculated. It wants to include in it not only expenditure for mi-
litary purposes, but also for development and humanitarian aid. In an election year it is hard 
to expect any significant expansion of the Bundeswehr’s involvement abroad. Instead, Germa-
ny will present its efforts to develop the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) within 
the EU and make the Bundeswehr a hub of military cooperation in the region as its greatest 
contributions to strengthening European defence. Germany may work towards even greater 
military integration within the EU, which – if the Social Democrats win the parliamentary 
elections – could mean favouring European security policy at the expense of trans-Atlantic 
relations and NATO.
Security expenditure instead of defence 
spending?
The German defence minister Ursula von der Ley-
en (CDU) visited Washington, DC on 10 February 
with a positive message. She agreed on the need 
to share the responsibility and costs between the 
United States and its European allies on a fairer 
basis. At the Munich conference von der Leyen 
confirmed that Germany would implement the 
commitments from the Newport summit to 
reach 2% of GDP on defence by 2025. She also 
referred to her investment package plan for the 
Bundeswehr, put forward last year; it would be 
worth €130 billion by 2030, although it has not 
so far been adopted by the German government. 
The minister’s announcement should not be seen 
as representing the German ruling coalition’s 
official position, but rather as an expression of 
the Atlanticist mindset of a part of the Christian 
Democratic Party and lobbying efforts by the de-
fence ministry to obtain additional funds from 
the federal budget for the underfunded Bunde-
swehr (see Appendix 1). 
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A different view on increasing defence spending 
was presented by the German foreign minister 
Sigmar Gabriel (SPD). At the Munich conference 
he warned against overestimating the level of 
2% of GDP, and questioned the direct link be-
tween an increase in defence budgets and an 
increase in global security. In his opinion, invest-
ing in crisis-prevention instruments, post-con-
flict reconstruction and economic cooperation, 
or even the reception and integration of refu-
gees, may be much more relevant. Gabriel also 
expressed doubt as to whether Germany would 
be able to spend €25 billion more on defence 
(additionally to the current spending) within 
a decade in order to meet NATO’s requirements. 
The security policy debate in Germany seems to 
be evolving into redefining the concepts -away 
from defence spending towards security expend-
iture, which covers not only defence budgets 
but also investment in diplomacy, crisis preven-
tion and development aid (which in recent years 
has run at 0.5%-0.7% of Germany’s GDP). At the 
Munich conference, Chancellor Angela Merkel 
also seemed to be in favour of this approach. 
By changing the discourse, Germany would 
no longer be the ‘whipping boy’ in the trans- 
Atlantic debate, but in fact one of the leaders in 
implementing the comprehensive approach. In 
the future, we may expect Germany to gradu-
ally increase its defence spending by more than 
the previously agreed levels, but still fail to meet 
its NATO obligations. The German CDU/CSU will 
also be more willing to meet US expectations 
than the SPD. At the same time, irrespective of 
the shape of the future ruling coalition, Ger-
many will support the rhetoric of the European 
Commission’s head Jean-Claude Juncker, who in 
Munich spoke in favour of considering not only 
European defence budgets in the trans-Atlantic 
balancing of the books, but also spending on de-
velopment and humanitarian aid. 
Diplomacy or military:  
how much German engagement?
The US’s expectations refer to more than the 
level of defence expenditure. Germany antici-
pates that it will come under pressure to be-
come more involved militarily in crises and 
conflicts around Europe: in the fight against 
so-called Islamic State in the Middle East, 
NATO’s operation in Afghanistan or in NATO’s 
activities on the eastern flank. American pres-
sure will certainly revive German discussions on 
the country’s role in European and internation-
al security policy, which were initiated by the 
defence minister, the foreign minister and the 
president of Germany at the Munich Security 
Conference in 2014. Their statements changed 
the German discourse; for three years now, 
there has been loud talk in Berlin about the 
‘new responsibility’ of Germany as the largest 
country in the EU with its global economic links 
and its dependency on the stability of the inter-
national order. As a result of these discussions, 
Germany has increased its diplomatic involve-
ment and its contributions to humanitarian and 
development aid. The growth of Germany’s po-
litical role was especially visible after Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea and aggression towards 
Ukraine. Germany (in consultation with the US) 
took the lead on behalf of the West in the ne-
gotiations attempting to find a solution to the 
conflict between Russia and Ukraine, as well as 
the responsibility to impose and maintain sanc-
tions against Moscow in the EU.  
Contrary to its allies’ expectations, Germa-
ny’s ‘new responsibility’ discourse has not re-
ally translated into more military involvement 
abroad. Germany is still reluctant to send 
troops on foreign operations; this has been 
done only under considerable pressure from 
Germany will favour not only Europe-
an defence budgets in the trans-Atlantic 
balancing of the books, but also spending 
on development and humanitarian aid.
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its allies, particularly in the case of operations 
where the Bundeswehr may participate in com-
bat (in Europe’s southern neighbourhood), 
or a politically controversial engagement 
(such as strengthening NATO’s eastern flank). 
Around 3300 soldiers of the German armed 
forces are currently involved in more than 
a dozen missions and operations, but they 
mainly carry out logistical, reconnaissance or 
medical tasks (see Appendix 2). In the case of 
Europe’s southern neighbourhood, it was pres-
sure from France after the Paris attacks in No-
vember 2015 which forced Germany to send six 
Tornado Recce aircraft for reconnaissance op-
erations over Syria, and to increase the quota 
of German military trainers in Iraq to 150 sol-
diers in early 2016. In the case of reinforcing 
NATO’s eastern flank, it was largely pressure 
from the US, Poland and the Baltic countries 
which forced Germany to make a more mean-
ingful contribution. Germany agreed to in-
crease its participation in the exercises and 
joint training in the Baltic Sea region, and to 
take over the role of the framework nation for a 
battalion-seized battle group in Lithuania (with 
450 soldiers). The main reason was not so much 
the aggressive policy of Russia as Berlin’s desire 
to maintain the cohesion of NATO and its own 
credibility within the Alliance.
In a year of parliamentary elections, it is dif-
ficult to expect that the German government 
will take (or the Bundestag will accept) any de-
cisions on the participation of Bundeswehr sol-
diers in operations in which they might become 
involved in combat, such as sending aircraft 
to bomb Islamic State positions in Syria and 
Iraq. However, it may safely be assumed that 
Germany will be willing to expand its training, 
logistical and reconnaissance activities abroad. 
Even an altered geopolitical situation – such as 
crises and conflicts in the eastern and south-
ern neighbourhoods of Europe, and tensions in 
trans-Atlantic relations – will not be able to eas-
ily change the German strategic culture. Germa-
ny defines itself as a civilian power, is convinced 
of the primacy of political over military solu-
tions and takes a comprehensive approach to 
security policy. Only constant pressure from its 
allies, as well as the influence of regional crises 
and conflicts, can bring about a gradual change 
in Germany’s approach to the role and use of 
military force in a security environment which 
is changing to the detriment of Europe and the 
wider world. A change in German security poli-
cy will also require a dialogue with the German 
public, which is sceptical of Germany’s assump-
tion of a new role.
The German response: more Europe
Since Germany will struggle to give a positive 
response to the US in terms of increasing de-
fence expenditure and foreign military involve-
ment, Berlin will primarily emphasise its efforts 
in strengthening European defence. Germany 
will emphasise and continue its policy aimed 
at strengthening the CSDP, and at developing 
the Bundeswehr’s military cooperation with the 
armed forces of Germany’s neighbouring allies. 
Germany was the main promoter of developing 
the CSDP in 2016. Together with France it au-
thored a non-paper in September 2016 entitled 
‘The revival of the CSDP. Towards broad, realistic 
and credible defence in the EU’. Berlin was, and 
still is, interested in implementing a comprehen-
sive approach to security and improving the ef-
ficiency of the EU’s civil-military crisis manage-
ment in Europe’s southern neighbourhood; in 
strengthening the integration of European armed 
forces; in increasing the number of multilateral 
procurement projects; and in creating a common 
market for arms and military equipment. These 
Germany is still reluctant to send troops on 
foreign operations, particularly in the case 
of operations where the Bundeswehr may 
participate in combat.
4OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 232
proposals were partially covered in the conclu-
sions of the EU Council and the European Council 
in November and December 2016. Berlin’s initi-
atives serve not only a common European goal; 
they are also aimed at strengthening Germany’s 
own political, military and industrial position – 
by making the Bundeswehr the hub of regional 
military cooperation, and by increasing export 
opportunities for the German arms industry. 
Germany has, within NATO, the EU and in its 
bilateral relations, consistently pursued the 
‘framework nations’ concept (which it initiated 
in 2012), with the Bundeswehr as the backbone 
of the structural integration of the armed forc-
es in the region. The concept is being applied in 
the German land forces in particular, in which 
division headquarters develop the capacity for 
integrating allied units. So far, the German land 
forces’ main partner has been the Netherlands, 
which affiliated two-thirds of its brigades to 
the German divisions. Currently Germany is 
developing cooperation with its Central Euro-
pean allies; on 15 February Germany signed a 
letter of intent with the Czech Republic and 
Romania. The Czech 4th Rapid Deployment Bri-
gade (one of two Czech brigades) is to be af-
filiated to the German 10th Armoured Division, 
and the Romanian 81st Mechanised Brigade 
(one of 10 Romanian manoeuvre brigades) to 
the German Rapid Forces Division (see Appen-
dix 3). This cooperation will include common 
activities of staff elements, training and exer-
cises, development of concepts and common 
military requirements, joint procurement and 
logistical support. Developing cooperation will 
contribute to creating multinational divisions 
under German command as part of the force 
pool for larger formations in NATO. Germany 
also wants to ‘Europeanise’ its navy; in 2016, 
Germany offered to take the role of framework 
nation for multilateral operations in the Baltic 
Sea with the German navy’s Maritime Opera-
tions Centre building the core structures. As 
Germany signed a German-Norwegian agree-
ment in February this year on the joint purchase 
of six 212A-class submarines produced by the 
German TKMS (four for Norway, two for Ger-
many), it also submitted a proposal to create 
an international training and exercise cluster 
for submarine warfare using the structures of 
the Deutsche Marine. Berlin hopes that Poland 
and the Netherlands will also join in case they 
decide to purchase German submarines. The 
German air force is less capable of developing 
framework capacities, as it struggles to main-
tain old and introduce new military equipment 
(A-400M transport aircraft, Eurofighter jets, Ti-
ger and NH90 helicopters). For these reasons, 
Germany is willing to participate in European 
cooperation projects on an equal footing with 
its other allies, though it will try to develop 
smaller projects like the NH90 multinational 
MEDEVAC unit. 
It is possible that Germany in the future will 
call for greater European integration within the 
CSDP framework. If the SPD wins the general 
elections and forms a ruling coalition, there 
will likely be more emphasis on developing 
the CSDP at the expense of trans-Atlantic re-
lations and NATO. However, it is unlikely that 
even a government dominated by the Social 
Democrats would propose strategic autono-
my for the EU. This would mean the need for 
a significant increase in German and European 
civilian and military engagement, as well as the 
development of a European nuclear deterrent, 
which (despite individual voices within Germa-
ny favouring such a move) has no political or 
social support. 
In response to US pressure, Berlin will pri-
marily emphasise its efforts to strengthen 
the CSDP and develop the Bundeswehr’s 
military cooperation with the armed forces 
of Germany’s neighbouring allies.
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APPENDIX 1
Military spending (as a percentage of GDP) and expenditure on investment 
by Germany and other NATO member states 
The reference point for trans-Atlantic discussions on defence expenditure is the declaration adopted 
by NATO at the Newport summit in 2014 on the allies’ intentions to increase defence spending to 2% 
of GDP within a decade, 20% of which is to be spent on investments in arms and military equipment. 
In recent years, Germany has spent around 1.1-1.2% of GDP on defence, which in terms of real 
expenditure fluctuated between €32bn and €34bn a year by 2016. According to NATO data, Germa-
ny spent the fourth biggest amount of NATO states in 2016 (US$40.6bn) with the USA in first place 
(US$664bn), then Great Britain (US$60.3bn) and France (US$43.6bn). 
In 2016, the German government decided on a small increase in military spending by 2020. The de-
fence budget for 2017 was increased by 8% (€2.8 billion) to €37 billion; according to current plans, 
expenditure should reach the level of €39.2 billion by 2020. Despite this nominal growth, however, 
German spending will continue to stay at the level of 1.2-1.3% of GDP. The reasons for Berlin’s deci-
sion to increase expenditure were: the increased involvement on the eastern flank of NATO, as well 
as in Africa and the Middle East; the need to invest in arms and military equipment; the need to 
increase the attractiveness of service in the armed forces (in January this year there were 178,000 
soldiers in full-time, contractual and voluntary service, i.e. there were 7000 vacancies in the armed 
forces which formally number 185,000); increasing the size of the Bundeswehr (up to 198,000 by 
2024); and full funding of retirement benefits for civilian and military employees as of 2015 (these 
had previously been financed from a separate pool of the federal budget). The current plans to 
increase the defence spending have been assessed as insufficient by the Ministry of Defence itself.
Defence Expenditure as a share of Gross Domestic Product
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APPENDIX 2
Bundeswehr’s participation in foreign operations (as of February 2017)
Operation Area Number 
of sol-
diers
Tasks and contribution
Resolute Support 
(NATO)
Afghanistan 966 responsibility for the command of NATO forces in the Northern region 
(Germany is the framework state in the north of Afghanistan for about 
20 allies and partners); training and mentoring the Afghan army and police; 
logistics, intelligence and reconnaissance, medical service
KFOR (NATO) Kosovo 532 officers in KFOR headquarters, field hospital, engagement in the German 
-Austrian operational reserve force battalion stationed in Germany, sent to 
Kosovo if necessary (last time in 2012)
Sea Guardian 
(NATO)
Mediterra-
nean Sea
0 currently no contribution, rotating presence 
EUTM Mali (EU) Mali 130 officers’ training and special training for the Malian army in the south of the 
country
EUTM Somalia 
(EU)
Somalia 9 consulting and training Somali armed forces 
EUVAVFOR 
Mediterranean 
–Sophia (EU)
Mediterra-
nean Sea
105 reconnaissance of and combatting smugglings network off the coast of 
Libya, training Libyan navy and coastguard, sea rescue operations (1 supply ship)
EUNAVFOR Soma-
lia – Atalanta (EU)
Horn  
of Africa
32 protection of maritime routes, currently reconnaissance activities (1 P-3C 
Orion maritime patrol aircraft)
MINUSMA (UN) Senegal, Mali 865 command, reconnaissance, strategic air transport (materiel, personnel, medical 
evacuation), tactical medical evacuation (4 NH90 transport helicopters), protec-
tion of personnel in the EUTM Mali mission (4 Tiger combat helicopters) 
UNIFIL (UN) Lebanon 127 monitoring sea routes, smuggling weapons (1 K130 corvette) 
UNMISS (UN) South Sudan 16 protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, securing supplies of human-
itarian aid
UNAMID (THE UN) Sudan 7 logistical, IT, medical and technical support
Operation against 
ISIS (international 
coalition under the 
aegis of the US)
Middle East 273 reconnaissance (6 Tornado Recce aircraft), refuelling in the air (1 Airbus 310 
MRTT), German NATO personnel on AWACS airborne early warning and con-
trol aircraft
Training mission 
in Iraq (interna-
tional coalition 
under the aegis of 
the US)
Iraq/ 
Kurdistan
143 training Iraqi armed forces
Equipment as share of Defence Expenditure
Source: NATO, Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2009-2016)
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APPENDIX 3
Simplified structure of the Bundeswehr’s land forces with the affiliated allied brigades
 
Land Forces
Command
Rapid
Reaction
Force Division
1st Armoured 
Division
Airborne 
Brigade
Special Forces
3 helicopter 
regiments
(2 transport,
1 combat)
11th Airmobile 
Brigade 
(Netherlands)
9th Armoured 
Training 
Brigade
21st Armoured 
Brigade
41st Mechanised 
Brigade
43rd Mechanised 
Brigade
(Netherlands)
10th Armoured
Division
23rd Light 
Infantry 
Brigade
12th Armoured 
Brigade
37th Mechanised 
Brigade
4th Rapid
Deployment 
Brigade
(Czech Republic)
81st Mechanised 
Brigade
(Romania)
